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Abstract 
 
This study empirically investigates the extent of noncompliance with the tax code and 
examines the determinants of federal income tax evasion in the U.S.  Employing a refined version 
of Feige’s (1986; 1989) General Currency Ratio (GCR) model to estimate a time series of 
unreported income as our measure of tax evasion,  we find that 18-23 % of total reportable income 
may not properly be reported to the IRS.  This gives rise to a 2009 “tax gap” in the range of $390-
$537 billion. As regards the determinants of tax noncompliance, we find that federal income tax 
evasion is an increasing function of the average effective federal income tax rate, the unemployment 
rate, the nominal interest rate, and per capita real GDP, and a decreasing function of the IRS audit 
rate. Despite important refinements of the traditional currency ratio approach for estimating the 
aggregate size and growth of unreported economies, we conclude that the sensitivity of the results to 
different benchmarks, imperfect data sources and alternative specifying assumptions precludes 
obtaining results of sufficient accuracy and reliability to serve as effective policy guides.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Tax evasion, (the use of illegal means to avoid tax payments) effectively defrauds the 
government of legally due tax revenues, thereby increasing the nation’s debt burden and reducing 
the government’s ability to provide public services. Noncompliance with fiscal rules shifts real 
resources from honest taxpayers to dishonest evaders, and tax liabilities from present to future 
generations.  Such inequities precipitate greater discontent with the government and further erode 
public revenues.  In light of these consequences, economists strive to estimate the magnitude, 
composition, growth and determinants of tax evasion in the hope of implementing public polices 
likely to improve fiscal compliance.  
 In the U.S., tax evasion is accomplished by underreporting taxable income and/or 
overstating allowable deductions. Since such noncompliance is a punishable illegal behavior that 
individuals attempt to hide, directly measuring the magnitude of tax evasion is at best a difficult, 
imprecise and elusive task. Survey methods are unreliable because respondents understandably will 
not wish to admit to illegal behavior. Highly intensive audit procedures have been shown incapable 
of detecting large proportions of unreported incomes, particularly in the absence of rigorous 
information return requirements and/or income tax withholding at source.
3
  Nevertheless, Slemrod 
(2007, p.26) contends that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) TCMP audits represent “the most 
careful and comprehensive estimates of the extent and nature of tax noncompliance anywhere in 
the world” and as such, aggregated TCMP measures of unreported income may provide the best 
available benchmark for estimating the magnitude of evasion in the U.S. 
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  Estimating how evasion behavior changes over time is equally challenging, inevitably 
requiring highly simplifying assumptions. IRS projections of tax evasion over time rely on the 
restrictive assumption that “voluntary reporting percentages have remained at 1982 levels for each 
income, deduction, and credit item”.4  Alternatively, trends in aggregate unreported income may be 
inferred by postulating a relationship between the unobserved evasion behavior and some observed 
macro variable such as the public’s use of currency.5 Tracking observable aggregate currency usage 
as a proxy for unobserved tax evasion is justified because cash is the preferred medium of exchange 
for transactions that individuals wish to hide.  Cash transactions do not leave a paper trail. This 
study employs a currency demand approach to estimate the temporal pattern of evasion while basing 
its estimate of the magnitude of evasion on an IRS audit based benchmark measure of unreported 
income. Times series estimates of the ratio of unreported to reported income are then employed to 
analyze the determinants of income tax evasion. 
 The rich theoretical literature on tax evasion [Allingham & Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki 
(1974), Spicer & Lundsted (1976), Garcia (1978), Spicer & Thomas (1982), Carson (1984), 
Slemrod (1985), Baldry (1987), Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, & Spurr (1991), Thurman 
(1991), Alm, Jackson, & McKee (1992),Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, & Slutsky (1994), 
Yaniv (1994), Caballe & Panades (1997), Sandmo (2005)] has been comprehensively reviewed 
and analyzed by Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein (1998), Slemrod (2007) and 
Slemrod and Weber (2011). The literature’s theoretical models are inventive and mathematically 
elegant and can be employed to identify variables that are likely to affect tax compliance behavior.  
However, the plethora of behavioral assumptions and alternative model specifications often yield 
conflicting results regarding the expected signs and magnitudes of many of the key variables 
believed to effect tax evasion.  Empirical analysis is required if these theoretical ambiguities are to 
be resolved. 
Section 2 reviews how intensive TCMP audit studies can be aggregated to obtain estimates 
of unreported legal source income. This magnitude is combined with separate estimates of illegal 
source income to obtain a rough benchmark estimate of total unreported adjusted gross income for a 
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particular year. Section 3 develops a refined version of Feige’s (1986;1989)  general currency ratio 
(GCR) model  which links the unknown temporal pattern of noncompliance to observed currency 
usage on the assumption that currency is the preferred medium of exchange for conducting 
transactions that individuals wish to hide from the fiscal authority. The fourth section describes the 
determinants of tax evasion and the fifth presents our empirical results. The final section includes a 
summary of our findings and our conclusions. 
  
2. Measuring Tax Evasion 
 The first, and often most difficult problem encountered in any empirical attempt to 
analyze the determinants of tax evasion is to define and estimate noncompliance. Tax evasion 
activities give rise to the “unreported economy”6 whose magnitude is measured by “unreported 
income” (Yu).   “Unreported” income is the difference between the total amount of income (YT) 
that should be reported to the tax authority under full compliance with the tax code and the 
amount actually reported (Yo). (YT) is typically unobserved whereas the income actually reported 
(Yo) corresponds to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). The total amount of income that should be 
reported to the fiscal authority (YT) includes income earned in both the legal and the “illegal” 
economy
7
. Illegal income earned in the production and distribution of prohibited goods and 
services, is nonetheless taxable under the U.S. fiscal code. Our first task then is to obtain the best 
available aggregate measure of unreported legal plus illegal source income.  
 Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein (1998, p. 836) suggest that “the most reliable information 
about noncompliance is based on actual tax return information that has been thoroughly 
examined by auditors” as part of the IRS (TCMP) which attempts to measure “unreported” 
income
8
 and the national “tax gap”.9  The last TCMP audit undertaken by the IRS was for the tax 
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year 1988.
10
 In 1988 the IRS estimated that $449.1 billion of legal source income was 
unreported as a result of misreporting on filed returns and delinquencies of non-filers.
11
 The IRS 
did not provide an estimate of illegal unreported income for 1988; however it did publish an 
estimate of $34.2 billion of illegal source income from drugs, illegal gambling and prostitution 
for the year 1981.
12
 Assuming that the ratio of illegal to legal unreported income in 1981 
remained roughly constant over time, we infer unreported illegal income for the year 1988 and 
then utilize the estimated sum of legal and illegal unreported income relative to reported AGI as 
a “benchmark” approximation of the relative magnitude of tax evasion in 1988. Our second 
benchmark employs an estimate of unreported income based on the most recent IRS estimate of 
the gross tax gap which amounted to $345 billion in 2001.
13
 Given these benchmarks, we then 
proceed to construct time series estimates of the relative size of the unreported economy 
employing a refined version of the General Currency Ratio (GCR) model.  
 
3. The General Currency Ratio (GCR) Model 
  The most common method for estimating the relative size and growth of the unreported 
economy (Yu/Yo) relies on a restrictive variant of the general currency ratio (GCR) model 
described in Feige (1986; 1989).
14
 The most restrictive specification of the GCR model 
employed by (Cagan, 1958; Gutmann, 1977), known as the “simple currency ratio” (C/D) model 
assumes that: 
a) the entire stock of currency is held domestically;  
b) that currency is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported transactions; 
                                                                  
since 1981. 
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The relative size of the “unreported economy” is typically measured as Yu/ Yo=α. The “noncompliance rate” (η) is 
then measured as Yu/ (Yu+ Yo) = α/ (1+α).  
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c)  that the amount of unreported income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in the 
unreported sector is the same as the amount of reported income produced by a dollar of 
currency transacted in the reported economy, that is , that the income velocities of the 
reported and unreported sectors are identical; 
d)  that the ratio of currency to checkable deposits remains constant except for changes 
induced by the growth in unreported income. 
e) that in some benchmark year (typically 1940) unreported income was zero. 
 As described in Appendix A, these restrictions imply that the relative size of the 
unreported economy (α) can be estimated as follows: 
 
(1)    
   
   
 
        
        
  
 
 
where, C=currency, D=checkable deposits and ko=(C/D)1940, for all t.  
 This simple currency ratio model has obvious strengths and weaknesses. Its critics rightly 
cite the simplicity and restrictiveness of the assumptions typically required to obtain estimates of 
the unreported economy. Yet the model’s simplicity is also its strength since the model is 
transparent, easily replicable and therefore readily subject to sensitivity testing.  In the analysis 
that follows, we examine the implications of relaxing each of the restrictive assumptions in order 
to determine how their relaxation affects both the magnitude and the temporal pattern of 
noncompliance in the U.S. To anticipate our results, we find that both the magnitude and 
temporal profile of evasion behaviors are significantly affected by a relaxation of the restrictive 
assumptions. 
 Figure 1 displays the temporal pattern of the estimated noncompliance rate [η = (α/1+α)] 
derived from the highly restrictive simple C/D model (1940=0) whose solution is given by 
equation (1). The noncompliance rate, assumed to be zero in 1940, rises to a peak of 10 percent 
by the end of World War II, declines until the early 1960’s and then gradually trends upward 
until the early 1990’s when it rises implausibly to peak at roughly 46 percent in 2007.  
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 Our first modification of the simple model is to relax assumption (a), recognizing that 
varying quantities of U.S. currency are held abroad. We employ Feige’s (2012) new temporal 
estimates of overseas currency holdings to generate a time series of domestic currency (Cdom) 
which is then used instead of total currency. When the noncompliance rate is re-estimated by the 
simple C/D model with domestic currency (Cdom) substituted for total amount of currency (C) in 
equation (1), we find a significant reduction in magnitude of estimated noncompliance after the 
mid 1960’s but the implausible increase in noncompliance after 1995 is still apparent. (See 
Figure 1)     
The second modification to the currency ratio model involves a relaxation of assumption 
(d), requiring us to account for technological innovations in the financial industry that 
significantly reduced the volume of “checkable deposits” (D) and hence raised the Cdom /D ratio 
in a manner unrelated to tax evasion behaviors.
15
 When banks began to offer retail sweep 
programs, checkable deposits were swept into money market deposit accounts, enabling banks to 
profitably reduce the level of demand deposits subject to reserve requirements. In 1994 these 
“sweeps” amounted to only $7.5 billion dollars but have subsequently increased to $800 billion 
in 2010. By adjusting for these “sweeps” in our definition of checkable deposits (Dadj), we 
explicitly account for an important factor affecting the conventional C/D ratio which is unrelated 
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to developments in the unreported economy.
16
 Figure 1 shows that both the magnitude and 
temporal pattern of estimated noncompliance changes dramatically once we account for changes 
in domestic currency holdings and for financial innovations affecting checkable deposits which 
are unrelated to evasion behaviors. In short, assumptions (a) and (d) are indeed overly restrictive 
and the noncompliance estimates are highly sensitive to their relaxation.  
 We can now further refine the GCR model described in Appendix A by relaxing 
additional restrictive assumptions. As shown in the appendix, the GCR model has the general 
solution: 
(2)      
 
 
   
          –      
             –    
 
where, β is the ratio of the income velocity in the reported sector to the income velocity in the 
unreported sector; and ko and ku respectively represent the currency/deposit ratios in the reported 
and unreported sectors.  
 Recall that assumption (e) [that unreported income in 1940 was zero] was necessary to 
obtain an empirical benchmark estimate of the parameter ko .  We can now relax (e) and instead 
employ an independent audit based IRS estimate of unreported income for a year in which such a 
benchmark is available.
17
 As described in Section 2 above, two benchmark years were chosen, 
the 1988 TCMP estimate and 2001 NPR based estimate. 
 Figure 2 displays the sensitivity of the temporal pattern of noncompliance when the 1940 
benchmark is replaced by the 1988 and 2001 benchmarks.
18
 The new audit based benchmarks 
raise the initial 1940 noncompliance rate from zero to 9-11 percent and noncompliance rates now 
peak at 19-20 percent by the end of World War 11. The 1980’s and 1990’s displayed 
considerable fluctuations which Cebula (2001; 2004) and Cebula, Coombs & Yang (2009) 
showed could be attributed to variations in tax rates, the public’s dissatisfaction with 
government, and audit rates. By 2010, the audit based noncompliance rate estimates are 18-19 
                     
16
 The growth of plastic payment alternatives would also be expected to reduce the currency/deposit ratio over 
time. Failure to specifically account for this trend leads to an underestimate of the true noncompliance rate over 
time. 
17
 Appendix A, equation (A: 10) shows the derivation of the new benchmark. 
18
 The 1988 benchmark includes TCMP estimates of unreported legal source income and projected unreported 
illegal source income. The 2010 benchmark excludes unreported illegal source income but may overstate unreported 
legal source income because it is based on the gross tax gap.    
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percent, roughly double those produced by the 1940 base year model. Despite these significant 
differences in magnitudes, the temporal patterns of the alternative estimates are similar. 
 A further refinement of the GCR model involves a relaxation of assumption (b) namely, 
that currency is the exclusive medium of exchange used for unreported transactions. This  
 
 
 
assumption is likely to be violated since tax evasion includes the underreporting of income from 
income source categories for which payments are typically made by check.
19
 In particular, 
underreporting of interest, dividends, state tax refunds, capital gains, taxable unemployment 
benefits, pensions and annuities, estates and trusts and taxable social security are all likely to be 
income sources largely paid by check. The 1988 TCMP audit reveals that the sum of unreported 
filer income in all of the above categories amounted to 18 percent of total unreported filer 
income.
20
 If we assume that 20 percent of unreported income transactions are paid by check and 
80 percent by cash, the currency deposit ratio in the unreported economy (ku) = 4. As displayed 
in Figure (2), a relaxation of the assumption that all unreported incomes are paid in cash leads to 
a substantially higher estimate of the noncompliance rate, but leaves the temporal pattern of 
noncompliance essentially unchanged. 
                     
19
 The Internal Revenue Service (1979) citing underreporting of interest and dividend payments observes that “the 
unreported income problem extends beyond incomes paid in currency.” P.13 
20
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 Finally, it is possible to relax assumption (c), namely, that the income velocities in the 
unreported and reported sectors are identical. As shown by equation (2) the magnitude of 
unreported income is directly proportional to the reciprocal of the velocity ratio β. The most 
plausible scenario is that unreported incomes generated by cash payments are concentrated in the 
service sectors, which require fewer intermediate transactions. Therefore, β is likely to be less 
than one and the noncompliance rates exhibited in Figures 1 and 2 are likely to be 
underestimated.  
 The implications of the GCR model estimates of unreported income for the magnitude 
and temporal pattern of the estimated tax gap are displayed in Figure 3, which also includes the 
available IRS tax gap estimates. Since 2001, the tax gap appears to have peaked in 2007 at 
between $435-596 billion and in 2009 the gap decreased and is estimated to lie in the $390 - 
$537 billion dollar range.
21
   
 
 
 
 Recent attention has been focused on an additional tax gap resulting from an estimated $5 
trillion in assets held in offshore tax havens. The IRS reports that the annual revenue loss to the 
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U.S. from these tax havens is in excess of $70 billion per year.
22
 Taking account of the tax gap 
resulting from these overseas tax havens, overall tax evasion may cost the U.S. government 
between $500 -$600 billion per year in lost revenues. 
 
4. Modeling the Determinants of Noncompliance 
 
Given our empirical estimates of the temporal path of the unreported economy, we now 
specify a model of noncompliance which we will estimate empirically.  In this study, the relative 
probability that the representative economic agent will not report his/her taxable income to the IRS 
is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits to the agent of not reporting 
income, eb, and as a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the agent of not reporting 
income, ec. Thus, the ratio of the probability of not reporting income to the IRS, pnr, to the 
probability of reporting income to the IRS, (1-pnr), is described for the representative economic 
agent by: 
 
(3) pnr/(1-pnr) = j(eb, ec), jeb > 0,jec < 0  
        
Expressing probabilities in relative terms such as shown in equation (3) possesses the virtue that it 
reflects the form of the tax evasion data described above, namely as the ratio of unreported to 
reported income.  
The expected benefits from tax evasion are hypothesized to depend positively on the 
average effective tax rate (AET), the aggregate unemployment rate (UN), real income (INC), 
dissatisfaction with government (DIS), the interest rate (i), and negatively on a dummy variable 
representing the 1986 Tax reform act (TRA)  such that: 
  
(4) eb= g(AET, UN, INC, DIS, i TRA), 
 gAET > 0, gUN > 0, gINC > 0, gDIS > 0, g i3note > 0, gTRA <0, 
 
Cagan (1958), Bawley (1982), Tanzi (1982; 1983), Clotfelter (1983), and Feige (1994), all 
put forward the hypothesis that the expected benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are an 
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increasing function of the federal income tax rate. To reflect the federal income tax rate, most 
previous studies using official data for the U.S. have adopted either of two alternative measures: an 
average effective federal income tax rate (AET) or the maximum marginal federal income tax rate 
(MAXT). We employ the AET measure because this tax rate is likely to be a more representative 
measure of the income tax rate for a larger portion of the taxpaying public than MAXT.  
 Following Alm & Yunus (2009), we expect a higher unemployment rate (UN) to be 
associated with a greater degree of income tax evasion, as unemployed workers (participate) in the 
“unreported economy”.  Moreover, employed workers, fearing future job losses, may also under-
report income as a means of hedging against expected future unemployment. We also expect tax 
evasion to be positively related to real income (INC) since higher income individuals are more 
likely to report income on Schedule C for which there are no information reporting or withholding 
requirements (Ali, Cecil & Knoblett, 2001) 
Noncompliance with the tax code is also believed to be related to the public’s dissatisfaction 
with the government (DIS).  Taxes are more willingly paid when taxpayers believe that tax revenues 
are being wisely employed to provide public services. Conversely, as the public’s distrust of the 
government grows, so does noncompliance. The variable (DIS) is an index of public dissatisfaction 
with the government, constructed from survey data collected by the University of Michigan Institute 
for Social Research, (2009). The DIS index is based on responses to three survey questions 
measuring :  (a) the degree to which the public distrusts public officials (other than the President) to 
fulfill their job obligations; (b) the degree to which the public regards government officials as 
dishonest; and (c) the degree to which the public believes that government officials waste tax 
dollars. The value of the index ranges from -1.5 to + 1.5, with a higher index value signifying a 
greater degree of dissatisfaction with government. 
 The expected benefits of tax evasion are also believed to increase as the opportunity costs of 
tax compliance increase.  As interest rates increase, any unreported income will yield a higher return 
than before. Accordingly, the higher the interest rate yield on, say, three year U.S. Treasury notes 
(i), the greater the expected benefit of tax evasion.  
Finally we postulate that the expected benefits of evasion were reduced during the first 
years of the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA).  Musgrave (1987, p. 59) 
described the TRA as “the most sweeping reform since the early 1940.” The TRA introduced a 
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number of reforms described in Barth (1991), Barth & Brumbaugh (1992), Ott & Vegari (2003), 
and Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull (1990).  Ott & Vegari (2003) noted that the TRA broadened the 
tax base by reducing itemized deductions, and once fully effective in 1988, replaced the fourteen 
bracket tax schedule with two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent. Musgrave further observes that 
prior to the TRA, the income tax base had been eroding. Musgrave was particularly dismayed by the 
widening of tax loopholes and the emergence of high income tax shelters that had “…gained 
momentum in recent years and undermined the public’s faith in the income tax.” Musgrave asserted 
that the TRA “…reversed these trends, a major accomplishment that all reformers will welcome.” 
To the extent that taxpayers regarded the TRA favorably, we would expect that compliance rates 
would improve at least temporarily.  Cebula, Coombs & Yang, 2009 found that studies of aggregate 
personal income tax evasion in the U.S. risk the problem of omitted-variable bias if they fail to 
somehow account for the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS are hypothesized
23
 to be an 
increasing function of the likelihood of being audited (AUDIT) as measured by the percentage of 
filed federal income tax returns that are formally audited by IRS examiners. 
 
(5) ec = h(AUDIT),  hAUDIT > 0  
 
This study adopts the probability of a formal audit as a measure of risk to the would-be tax 
evader. Unfortunately, insofar as IRS tax penalty data are unavailable for the full period covered by 
this study, we employ the IRS audit rate as the exclusive factor reflecting tax evasion risks.   
Substituting from (4) and (5) into (3) yields:  
 
(6) pnr/(1-pnr) = j(AET, TRA, UN, INC, DIS, i, AUDIT) 
jAET > 0, , jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jDIS > 0, ji,>0, jTRA <0,  jAUDIT < 0  
    
Let YT represent the total amount of adjusted gross income that should be reported to the IRS 
under full compliance with the tax code such that: 
                     
23
 See Friedland, (1982); De Juan,( 1989); Pestieau, Possen & Slutsky, (1994); Erard & Feinstein, ( 1994) and 
Caballe & Panades, (1997). 
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(7) YT  = UAGI + RAGI  = (pnr)* YT +(1-pnr)* YT 
   
where UAGI  is unreported adjusted gross income and RAGI is reported adjusted gross income. 
It follows that: 
 
(8) UAGI/RAGI = (pnr)* YT  /(1-pnr)* YT  = (pnr)/(1-pnr) = j(AET, UN, INC, DIS, i, TRA, AUDIT) 
jAET > 0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jDIS > 0, j i> 0, jTRA <0,  , jAUDIT < 0 .    
         
 
5. Empirical Results 
Based on the framework provided in (8) above, we estimate the following reduced-form 
equation: 
 
(9) (UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 AETt-1 + a2 TRAt + a3 UNt-1 + a4 INCt-1 + a5 DISt-1  
+ a6 AUDITt-1 + a7 it-1 + a8 TREND + u       
     
where:  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the unreported to reported adjusted gross income in year t expressed as 
a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
AETt-1 = the average effective federal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as a percent; 
TRAt= a binary (dummy) variable: TRAt=1 for the years 1986, 1987 and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
UNt-1= percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in year t-1;   
INCt-1 = per capita real GDP in year t-1 (expressed in year 2000 dollars); 
DISt-1 = the mean value of the public dissatisfaction with government index, year t-1,  
AUDITt-1= the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners;  
it-1 = the average interest rate yield in year t-1 on three year U.S. treasury notes, expressed as a 
percent per annum;  
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TREND = a linear trend variable; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
The reduced form (9) is estimated for the entire period of observation 1960 through 2008. In 
the interest of testing for robustness and consistency of results, as well as in the quest for potential 
additional insights, we also estimate (9) for the sub periods, 1970-2008 and 1980-2008. The data are 
annual. The explanatory variables, except for the binary TRA variable, are lagged in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems.
24
  
Three least squares regression estimates of equation (9) are provided in Table 1. In these 
estimates, all of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs. 
Furthermore, thirteen of these estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, one 
is statistically significant at the 2.5%, three are statistically significant at the five percent level, and 
two are statistically significant at the 10% level. Only the coefficients for the DIS variable fail to be 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  
As displayed in Table 1, the coefficient on the tax variable (AET) is positive in all three 
estimates and statistically significant. As expected, the higher the average effective federal income 
tax rate, the greater the extent of income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with most previous 
studies of income tax evasion using official data (Ali, Ceceil & Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 2001, 2004; 
Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994, 1996,1997; Klepper, Nagin and Spurr, 1991; Tanzi, 1982, 1983]. 
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs & Yang 
(2009), the TRA coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income 
tax evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. The estimated coefficients on the unemployment variable 
are all positive, as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases (1960-2008, 
1970-2008, and 1980-2008). Thus, there is strong evidence that the higher the unemployment rate, 
                     
24
The AET is the federal average tax rate from the NBER TAXSIM model. The AUDIT data were obtained from the 
Government Accounting Office (1996: Table I.1), and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994: Table 519, 1998: Table 550, 1999: 
Table 556, 2001: Table 546, 2010: Table 469). The TRA variable is a dummy variable; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
actually signed into law by President Reagan in October of 1986. The data for the variables UN, INC, and i were 
obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2009, Tables B-42, B-41, B-73). The DIS data were obtained from the 
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research (2009).The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this 
case represented by the variable UAGI/RAGI = Yu/Yo] were obtained from Feige (2012), as described in Section 2. For 
the interested reader, descriptive statistics for each of the variables in each of the three study periods are found in 
Appendix B: Table B:1, and the actual UAGI/RAGI data are provided in Table B:2.   
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the greater the extent of income tax evasion. This finding is compatible with the recent findings in 
Alm & Yunus (2009). 
 
Table 1. Empirical Estimates (Dependent Variable: (UAGI/RAGI) 
Variable\Estimation 1960-2008  1970-2008  1980-2008   
a0   -55.36   -53.9   -49.2 
 
AET   0.43**   0.56***  0.42* 
   (2.58)   (3.06)   (2.22) 
 
TRA   -3.56***  -3.65***  -3.59*** 
   (-6.39)   (-6.51)   (-6.96) 
 
UN   1.77***  1.79***  1.59*** 
   (10.36)   (10.24)   (7.64) 
 
INC   0.0039***  0.0039***  0.0038*** 
   (12.64)   (12.64)   (11.27) 
 
DIS   0.192   0.345#   0.172 
   (1.09)   (1.72)   (0.72) 
 
AUDIT   -0.73#   -0.968*  -1.24*  
   (-1.69)   (-2.07)   (-2.12) 
 
i   0.388***  0.365***  0.446*** 
   (5.08)   (4.68)   (4.47) 
 
TREND  -1.83***  -1.86***  -1.80*** 
   (-11.71)  (-11.73)  (-9.82) 
 
R
2
   0.91   0.86   0.81 
AdjR
2
   0.88   0.82   0.74 
DW   1.73   1.77   1.80 
***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; **indicates statistical significance at the 2.5% 
level; *indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and #indicates statistical significance at the 
10% level. Terms in parentheses are t-values. The least squares estimates are fully-modified OLS 
[FMOLS] estimates. 
 
Next, the estimated coefficients on the per capita real GDP variable (INC) are all positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for the three periods. The higher the real income level 
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(INC), the greater the degree to which tax evasion is expected to occur, ceteris paribus. The 
estimated coefficients on the public dissatisfaction with government variable, DIS, are all positive, 
as expected; however, only one of these coefficients is statistically significant at even the 10% level 
(that for the 1970-2008 period). Thus, it appears that this variable may have exercised only a very 
modest (if not negligible) impact on the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion 
over the study period. The estimated coefficients of the AUDIT variable exhibit the expected 
negatives signs and are also statistically significant.  Thus the likelihood of an audit appears to act as 
a deterrent to evasion and hence serves as a viable policy tool with which to combat personal 
income tax evasion. Finally, we find that a higher interest rate appears to encourage greater income 
tax evasion, by raising the opportunity costs of personal income tax compliance.  
In closing, we note that the coefficients of determination are relatively similar in magnitude 
in all three estimates, with the inference being that the model explains roughly five-sixths of the 
variation in income tax evasion. Furthermore, there is no autocorrelation in the estimates and as 
displayed in the correlation matrix of Table B:3 (Appendix B) , no serious multicollinearity among 
the variables in the model. Only two zero-order correlation coefficients barely exceed 0.5 in 
absolute value, and in these cases, the coefficients for the variables involved (UN, INC, and i) are all 
highly statistically significant.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 This empirical study employs a refined version of Feige’s (1986; 1989) general currency 
ratio model (GCR) in an effort to obtain time series estimates of U.S. unreported aggregate adjusted 
gross income for the period 1940-2010.  These time series estimates of unreported income are then 
employed in a regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between tax evasion and its presumed 
determinants, tax rates, income, unemployment, interest rates, audit rates and public attitudes 
toward the government. We find that the average tax rate, real income, the interest rate and the 
unemployment rate have the expected positive relationship with unreported income whereas the 
audit rate appears to deter tax evasion. The 1986 Tax reform Act appears to have had a short run 
effect reducing evasion whereas a variable reflecting dissatisfaction with the government has a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on evasion behavior. 
 Our paper contributes to literature that employs variants of the popular currency ratio 
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models to estimate the magnitude and temporal path of the unreported economy. We refine the 
methodology of currency demand approaches by addressing each of the typical germane critiques of 
the restrictive GCR model and examine the sensitivity of both the magnitude and growth of 
unreported income estimates to a relaxation of numerous restrictive assumptions.  First, we modify 
the currency ratio model by employing domestically held currency as the appropriate cash variable 
rather than total currency. Domestic cash holdings are derived from Feige’s 2012 new estimates of 
the amount of U.S. currency held abroad. We find that accounting for overseas currency 
significantly affects both the magnitude and temporal path of estimates of unreported income. 
 Garcia (1978) critiqued the currency ratio model for assuming that the ratio of currency to 
demand deposits was only affected by changes in tax evasion whereas financial innovations 
independent of noncompliance behaviors could significantly reduce demand deposit holdings and 
hence increase the observed currency ratio. We therefore relax this restrictive assumption by 
adjusting the checking deposit variable to take account of the major financial innovation of 
“sweeps”, thereby accounting for a financial innovation that increased the observed the currency 
ratio for reasons unrelated to changes in evasion behavior. We find that a failure to take account of 
this innovation would lead to a significant overstatement of both the magnitude and the growth of 
unreported income over time. Conversely, we note that the failure to take further account of the 
secular upward trend in credit and debit card use will lead to an underestimate of unreported income 
and an underestimate of its growth over time.
25
  
 The GCR model is further refined by eliminating the arbitrary assumption that in some year 
(typically 1940) tax evasion was nonexistent and instead we benchmark the model to an audit based 
estimate of the size of legal and illegal unreported income. The model is further modified to take 
account of the fact that currency is not the exclusive medium of exchange for transactions involving 
unreported incomes. Examination of specific categories of unreported income reveals that checks 
are used for payment for roughly 20 percent of aggregate unreported income. This modification is 
again shown to significantly raise the estimates of unreported income, albeit, not having much effect 
on the temporal path of tax evasion.  Similarly, we demonstrate that a relaxation of the typical 
assumption of equal income velocities in the recorded and unrecorded sectors will likely increase 
                     
25
 Note that the use of plastic payment methods reduces the demand for cash while increasing the demand for 
checking deposits, hence reducing the observed currency ratio over time.    
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estimates of tax evasion behavior without affecting the temporal path. 
The new estimates of noncompliance from the refined GCR model suggest that in 2009 
roughly 18-23 
26
 percent of total reportable income was not properly reported to the IRS. The 
estimated $1.8 -2.4 trillion of unreported income gives rise to an annual tax gap currently estimated 
to be $390 - $537 billion. The regression analysis gives intuitively plausible results concerning the 
determinants of evasion behavior.  Although the  foregoing estimates benefit from significant 
refinements of the currency ratio models widely in use
27
, the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
specifying assumptions, benchmarks, and data revisions concerning overseas currency leads us 
inextricably to the uncomfortable conclusion that the current state of our science is still incapable of 
producing sufficiently precise and reliable estimates of the magnitude and growth of unreported 
economies to serve as a dependable guide for public policy.
28
  
 
 
  
                     
26
 The lower estimate is based on GCR (1988) while upper is based on GCR (1988) Ku=4). 
27
 It should be noted that the widely cited and severely critiqued (Breusch, 2005, a, b, c; 2006) MIMIC model 
estimates are all presumably based on some highly simplified, albeit undocumented, currency demand approach.   
28
 Similar concerns are expressed in Feige and Urban (2008) in their investigation of estimates of the “unrecorded” 
economy in transition countries. 
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Appendix A: The General Currency Ratio (GCR) Model 
 
 The General Currency Ratio (GCR) model as described in Feige (1986; 1989) is a 
heuristic framework capable of representing a variety of common monetary approaches for 
obtaining time series estimates of the “unobserved” sector of the economy.  
Let: 
o = subscript to denote the observed sector 
u = subscript to denote the unobserved sector 
C= actual currency stock 
D= actual stock of checkable deposits 
Yo= observed income 
ko = ratio of domestic currency to checkable deposits in the observed sector 
ku = ratio of domestic currency to checkable deposits in the unobserved sector 
Vo= observed sector income velocity 
Vu = unobserved sector income velocity 
When the object of analysis is to estimate unreported income on federal income tax returns, the 
empirical counterpart to observed income is the IRS measure of adjusted gross income (AGI). 
The unobserved sector now is measured by Yu, namely unreported adjusted gross income.
29
The 
GCR model specifies the following: 
(A:1)  C = Co+ Cu  
(A:2) D = Do+ Du  
(A:3) ko= Co/ Do 
(A:4) ku = Cu / Du  
(A:5) Vo= Yo / Co+ Do 
(A:6) Vu = Yu / Cu + Du  
(A:7) β = Vo/ Vu   
                     
29
 When the  object of the analysis is to estimate” unrecorded” income, defined by Feige (1990) as “the amount of 
income that should (under existing rules and conventions) be recorded in national income accounting systems but is 
not recorded,” the analysis should be based on a National Income and Product account (NIPA) aggregate that is 
properly adjusted for non-monetary imputations and for imputations already included in the recorded aggregate 
which accounts for omissions due to underreporting on tax source data. See Feige (1989) and Feige and Urban 
(2008). 
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Equations (A: 1) and (A: 2) decompose the actual stocks of currency and checkable deposits 
into their reported and unreported components. Equations (A: 3) and (A: 4) are definitions of the 
terms ko   and   ku   which can be specified either as constants or functions. Similarly, (A: 5) and 
(A: 6) define income velocity in the two sectors. To solve the model for unreported income (Yu), 
we must evaluate (A: 6) in terms of the models observable variables namely, C, D and Yo. 
Repeated substitution and rearrangement of terms yields the general solution: 
(A: 8)       
 
 
   
          –      
             –    
 
The most restrictive variants of the GCR model impose the following assumptions: 
30
 
      a) The entire stock of currency is held domestically.   
b) Currency is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported transactions. 
 (Du → 0; ku → ∞) 
c) The income velocities in the reported and unreported sectors are identical. (β = 1) 
d) The ratio of currency to checkable deposits in the observed sector is constant over time.  
(kot = constant for all t)  
Imposing these assumptions on equation (8) yields the restrictive form of the GCR model,  
(A: 9)            
        
         
  
Empirical estimates of unreported income (     require an estimate of the parameter    which 
Cagan (1958) and Gutmann (1977) assumed could be approximated as follows: 
     e)      
  
  
        
 
 
      
The 1940 benchmark assumption implied that prior to World War II, income tax evasion was 
zero.
31
  The restrictive assumptions represented by (a….e) give rise to what is commonly known 
as the “simple currency ratio” model. Given a value of ko, obtained via assumption (e), Equation 
(A: 9) expresses the unknown unreported income as a simple function of observed variables. 
 In principle, any year t for which we have an independent estimate of both reported and 
unreported income can serve as “benchmark” year for estimating the GCR model. Given  
                     
30
 These assumptions were employed by Cagan (1958) and Gutmann (1977). Tanzi’s (1980) imposes the first three 
restrictive assumptions, but treats a variant of ko (C/M2) as a function rather than a constant.  
31
 In 1940, individual income taxes amounted to 14 percent of total government receipts. 
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 , we can solve equation (9) for kot : 
(A: 10)          
        
       
 
        
  
    
where    is the noncompliance rate. If kot = ko for all t, it is possible to generate a temporal path 
of the noncompliance rate from equation (A: 9). 
If we have independent knowledge concerning the values of the parameters, β and ku, 
assumptions (b) and (c) can be discarded and equation (A: 8) can be employed to directly solve 
for Yut. 
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Appendix B: Empirical results 
   
Table B:1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1960-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    19.17  2.93 
AET    13.83  1.086 
TRA    0.0408  0.19999  
UN    5.856  1.401 
INC    25437  7326 
DIS    0.0361  0.969 
AUDIT    2.0529  1.458 
i    6.415% 2.72% 
 
Period: 1970-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    20.159  2.423 
AET    13.989  1.087 
TRA    0.0513  0.2235 
UN    6.132  1.35 
INC    27833  6180 
DIS    0.43  0.63 
AUDIT    1.362  0.54 
i    6.873% 2.854% 
 
Period: 1980-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)   20.86  2.1414  
AET    13.934  1.21 
TRA    0.07  0.258  
UN    6.103  1.42 
INC    30353  5046 
DIS    0.387  0.651 
AUDIT    1.12  0.374 
i    6.76%  3.2% 
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Table B:2. Data for Dependent Variable, UAGI/RAGI, by Year, 1960-2008 
 
Year UAGI/RAGI   Year UAGI/RAGI 
1960 16.10    1985 21.11 
1961 15.47    1986 18.89 
1962 15.86    1987 17.42 
1963 16.44    1988 18.74 
1964 15.88    1989 21.06 
1965 14.62    1990 21.06 
1966 14.86    1991 21.39 
1967 15.36    1992 19.04 
1968 15.21    1993 17.70 
1969 15.32    1994 17.98 
1970 16.30    1995 20.01 
1971 16.04    1996 18.64 
1972 16.16    1997 18.66 
1973 16.27    1998 18.30 
1974 17.47    1999 20.55 
1975 18.81    2000 22.29 
1976 20.17    2001 22.73 
1977 20.37    2002 23.94 
1978 20.63    2003 23.17 
1979 21.14    2004 21.57 
1980 22.84    2005 21.98 
1981 22.25    2006 23.85 
1982 22.93    2007 24.90 
1983 21.46    2008 23.94 
1984 21.86 
 
UAGI/RAGI is expressed as a percentage. 
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Table B:3 Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, 1970-2008 
 
 AET UN INC AUDIT   DIS i TRA   
 
AET  1.00 
UN  0.325  1.00 
INC -0.265 -0.561 1.00 
AUDIT 0.393  0.441 0.325 1.00 
DIS  0.267  0.252 -0.291 0.475  1.00 
i  0.481  0.412 -0.571 0.403  0.147 1.00 
TRA  0.178  0.075 -0.068 -0.109  -0.111 0.121 1.00 
 
